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1 
ARTICLE 
SUING RUSSIA:  
HOW AMERICANS CAN FIGHT BACK AGAINST 
RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 
William J. Aceves* 
ABSTRACT 
The evidence of Russian intervention in American politics is 
overwhelming. In the midst of the 2016 US presidential campaign, a 
growing number of inflammatory social media posts addressing 
various political topics emerged on Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. 
These posts supported the candidacy of Donald Trump, condemned the 
influx of refugees and migrants, and promoted racial divisions in the 
United States. Through clicks, likes, shares, and retweets, these 
messages reached millions of Americans. But, these messages did not 
originate in the United States; they were drafted and disseminated 
through inauthentic social media accounts created and controlled by 
the Internet Research Agency, an obscure foreign corporation with 
direct contacts to the Russian government. This propaganda campaign 
was part of Project Lakhta, a Russian operation designed to undermine 
American democracy. 
In response, the US government filed criminal indictments against 
several Russian nationals and corporations implicated in Project 
Lakhta. Social media companies released thousands of files that 
document Russian intervention and purged many of these inauthentic 
accounts. 
 
* William J. Aceves is the Dean Steven R. Smith Professor of Law at California Western 
School of Law. Gabor Rona offered helpful comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. 
Andrea Alberico, Regina Calvario, Sara Emerson, Lillian Glenister, Warsame Hassan, Ash 
Kargaran, and Stacey Zumo provided excellent research assistance. All errors and opinions are 
the author’s sole responsibility. 
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This Article proposes a different response—one that directly 
targets the Russian government. Because its actions violated numerous 
international norms, Russia is subject to proceedings before several 
international human rights bodies. And, significantly, these 
proceedings can be brought by the very people who were the targets of 
the Russian campaign—the American people. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the midst of the 2016 US presidential campaign, thousands of 
inflammatory social media posts emerged on Facebook, Instagram, and 
Twitter.1 These posts supported the candidacy of Donald Trump and 
denounced Hillary Clinton, condemned the influx of refugees and 
migrants, and promoted racial divisions in the United States. Many 
used offensive stereotypes, virulent tropes, and violent imagery to 
convey their inflammatory messages. The messages were sent by social 
media accounts from several groups, including Secured Borders, Being 
 
1. See generally Paul M. Barrett et al., NYU Stern Center, Combating Russian 
Disinformation: The Case for Stepping Up the Fight Online (2018); KATHLEEN HALL 
JAMIESON, CYBER-WAR: HOW RUSSIAN HACKERS AND TROLLS HELPED ELECT A PRESIDENT 
(2018); Paris Martineau, How Instagram Became the Russian IRA’s Go-To Social Network, 
WIRED (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/how-instagram-became-russian-iras-
social-network/ [https://perma.cc/K668-2RHM]. 
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Patriotic, Heart of Texas, and Stop A.I. [All Invaders].2 Through clicks, 
likes, shares, and retweets, these messages reached millions of 
Americans.3 But, these messages did not originate in the United States; 
they were drafted and disseminated through inauthentic social media 
accounts controlled by the Internet Research Agency, an obscure 
foreign corporation with direct contacts to the Russian government.4 
The work of the Internet Research Agency was part of a larger 
propaganda campaign authorized by the Russian government known as 
Project Lakhta.5 Project Lakhta was designed to influence the 2016 US 
presidential campaign by supporting the candidacy of Donald Trump.6 
 
2. Elizabeth Dwoskin, How Russian Content Ended Up on Pinterest, WASH. POST (Oct. 
11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/10/11/how-russian-
content-ended-up-on-pinterest/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.10f3818ac6a8 
[https://perma.cc/25XZ-WAB6]; Yochai Benkler et al., Are the Russians Coming?, in 
NETWORK PROPAGANDA: MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION, AND RADICALIZATION IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 235, 241 (Yochai Benkler et al. eds., 2018). 
3. See Gillian Cleary, Twitterbots: Anatomy of a Propaganda Campaign, SYMANTEC (June 
5, 2019), https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/twitterbots-propaganda-
disinformation [https://perma.cc/SR8U-8LBB]; Bruce Schneier, Toward an Information 
Operations Kill Chain, LAWFARE (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/toward-
information-operations-kill-chain [https://perma.cc/Z8D2-LVPS]. 
4. See generally JONATHAN MASTERS, COUNCIL FOR. REL., RUSSIA, TRUMP, AND THE 
2016 U.S. ELECTION (2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/russia-trump-and-2016-us-
election [https://perma.cc/PT8C-3LSQ]; April Glaser, What We Know About How Russia’s 
Internet Research Agency Meddled in the 2016 Election, SLATE (Feb. 16, 2018), 
https://slate.com/technology/2018/02/what-we-know-about-the-internet-research-agency-and-
how-it-meddled-in-the-2016-election.html [https://perma.cc/YLK7-R4ZK]; Krishnadev 
Calamur, What is the Internet Research Agency?, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 16, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/russia-troll-farm/553616/ 
[https://perma.cc/UF2B-8RYT]; David E. Sanger, Putin Ordered ‘Influence Campaign’ Aimed 
at U.S. Election, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/06/us/politics/russia-hack-report.html 
[https://perma.cc/8CDC-V6FP]. 
5. Lee Ferran, What you Need to Know About the Indictment on Russian Influence, ABC 
NEWS (Feb. 20, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/indictment-russian-
influence/story?id=61147179 [https://perma.cc/4TWD-5KDB]; Charlie Osborne, Project 
Lakhta: Russian National Charged with US Election Meddling, ZDNET (Oct. 22, 2018), 
https://www.zdnet.com/article/russian-national-charged-with-us-election-meddling/ 
[https://perma.cc/GR6C-LRBW]; Sadie Gurman & Byron Tau, U.S. Charges Russian With 
Trying to Influence 2018 Midterms, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 19, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-says-china-russia-iran-trying-to-intervene-with-elections-
1539973093 [https://perma.cc/EH3C-4BEY]; Adam Goldman, Justice Dept. Accuses Russians 
of Interfering in Midterm Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/us/politics/russia-interference-midterm-elections.html 
[https://perma.cc/6W32-NFYK]. 
6. Scott Shane, These Are the Ads Russia Bought on Facebook in 2016, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/us/politics/russia-2016-election-facebook.html 
[https://perma.cc/3KQW-TETM]; Jane Mayer, How Russia Helped Swing the Election for 
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It was also designed to manipulate the US political system and 
undermine the democratic process.7 And, it continued after the 2016 
election, echoing the Trump administration’s populist agenda.8 In 
historical terms, this was a propaganda campaign; in modern terms, it 
was information warfare. Regardless of how it is captioned, Russia’s 
online campaign was systematic, pernicious, and affected human rights 
in the United States on a massive scale.9 It undermined the right of 
individuals to be free from racial and ethnic discrimination. It violated 
religious freedom and demeaned religious minorities. It also affected 
the right of individuals to vote and to hold opinions without 
interference. 
In response, the US government has filed criminal indictments 
against several Russian nationals and corporations implicated in 
Project Lakhta.10 These charges addressed violations of federal election 
laws, identity theft, foreign agent registration requirements, and 
conspiracy. The US military has also conducted cyber operations 
against the Internet Research Agency and other Russian targets.11 
Project Lakhta was even an integral part of Special Counsel Robert 
Mueller’s investigation and subsequent report on Russian interference 
in the 2016 presidential election.12 Legislation has been proposed in 
 
Trump, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 1, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/01/how-russia-helped-to-swing-the-election-
for-trump [https://perma.cc/84DE-FPD8]; Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, The Plot to Subvert an 
Election, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/politics/russia-interference-election-
trump-clinton.html [https://perma.cc/8HPL-ALRS]. 
7. See, e.g., Bruce Zagaris, Russian Indicted for Cybercrime and Interfering with 2016 and 
2018 Elections, 34 INT’L ENF. L. REP. 561, 562 (2018). 
8. Id. at 561. 
9. See infra Pt IV. 
10. See, e.g., United States of America v. Elena Alekseevna Khusyaynova, No. 1:18-MJ-
464, (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2018); United States of America v. Internet Research Agency, No. 18-
cr-0032 (DLF), (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018). 
11. Ben Buchanan, What to Make of Cyber Command’s Operation against the Internet 
Research Agency, LAWFARE (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-make-cyber-
commands-operation-against-internet-research-agency# [https://perma.cc/H9XK-LTUE]; Ellen 
Nakashima, U.S. Cyber Command Operation Disrupted Internet Access of Russian Troll 





12. ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION 
INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (Mar. 24, 2019), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5955118-The-Mueller-Report.html 
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Congress to address Russian intervention.13 In addition, social media 
companies have released thousands of files that document Russian 
intervention and have purged many of these inauthentic accounts.14 
They have also revised their policies to make it more difficult for 
foreign governments to undertake similar propaganda campaigns.15 
This Article proposes a different response—one that directly 
targets the Russian government. This Article frames Russia’s actions 
and the ensuing harms as human rights issues.16 Because its actions 
violated numerous international norms, Russia is subject to 
 
[https://perma.cc/UXJ6-YU8H ] [hereinafter MUELLER REPORT]; Letter from William P. Barr, 
U.S. Att’y Gen., to the Hon. Lindsey Graham, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, United States 
Senate, et al. (Mar. 24, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/24/706351394/read-the-justice-
departments-summary-of-the-mueller-report [https://perma.cc/E6RJ-KMKR]. See generally 
David A. Graham, No One Wants to Talk About Mueller’s Most Definitive Conclusion, THE 
ATLANTIC (May 30, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/no-one-wants-
talk-about-muellers-most-important-conclusion/590674/ [https://perma.cc/TUT3-T8S7]. Alina 
Polyakova, What the Mueller Report Tells Us About Russian Influence Operations, BROOKINGS 
(Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/04/18/what-the-
mueller-report-tells-us-about-russian-influence-operations/ [https://perma.cc/XBV2-LW6E]. 
13. See, e.g., Jordain Carney, Senate Passes Bill to Deny Entry for Individuals Who Meddle 
in U.S. Elections, THE HILL (June 3, 2019, 8:21 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/floor-
action/senate/446763-senate-passes-bill-to-deny-entry-for-individuals-who-meddle-in-us 
[https://perma.cc/5K3C-GW62]. 
14. Kelvin Chan, Facebook Shuts Hundreds of Russia-Linked Pages, Accounts Over 
“Inauthentic Behavior,” USA TODAY (Jan. 17, 2019), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2019/01/17/facebook-shuts-down-hundreds-russia-
linked-pages-accounts/2603319002/ [https://perma.cc/2SUT-LKKG]; Nicholas Fandos & 
Kevin Roose, Facebook Identifies an Active Political Influence Campaign Using Fake Accounts, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/us/politics/facebook-
political-campaign-midterms.html [https://perma.cc/JQ85-ZYRF]. 
15.  See, e.g., Paresh Dave, Facebook Defends Russia Response, Updates Plan to Curb 
Misbehavior, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-
content/facebook-defends-russia-response-updates-plan-to-curb-misbehavior-
idUSKCN1NK2MO [https://perma.cc/PTN5-Y8Q7]. 
16.  See Scott J. Shackelford, Should Cybersecurity Be a Human Right? Exploring the 
“Shared Responsibility” of Cyber Peace, 55 STAN. J. INT’L L 155, 165 (2019); Carly Nyst & 
Nick Monaco, State-Sponsored Trolling: How Governments are Deploying Disinformation as 
Part of Broader Digital Harassment Campaigns, INST. FOR THE FUTURE, 46 (2018) available at 
http://www.iftf.org/fileadmin/user_upload/images/DigIntel/IFTF_State_sponsored_trolling_re
port.pdf [https://perma.cc/V22A-8W9T]; Helsinki Summit: A Review of Vladimir Putin’s 
Record of Human Rights Violations and Attacks on Democratic Institutions, HUM. RTS. FIRST 
(July 18, 2018), available at https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/factsheet-
Putin-July-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9ZF-7W3K]; Scott J. Shackelford, Human Rights and 
Cybersecurity Due Diligence: A Comparative Study, 50 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 859, 860 (2017); 
Gabor Rona & Lauren Aarons, State Responsibility to Respect, Protect and Fulfill Human Rights 
Obligations in Cyberspace, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 503, 504 (2016). 
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proceedings before several international human rights bodies.17 These 
proceedings can overcome the unique challenges of cyber propaganda 
campaigns.18 And, significantly, these proceedings can be brought by 
the very people who were the targets of the Russian campaign—the 
American people.19 
In fact, there is no other viable mechanism for pursuing these 
claims against Russia. There is no indication the United States will 
pursue claims against Russia in any international tribunal. Some 
scholars have questioned whether Russia’s actions even violate US 
sovereignty.20 Other scholars have acknowledged the perceived 
shortcomings of international law and have proposed new regimes to 
address state liability in cyberspace.21 Civil claims against the Russian 
government in US courts would face significant challenges, both for 
jurisdictional and substantive reasons. In the United States, civil 
proceedings against Russia would be governed by the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act, and case law indicates such lawsuits would 
be unsuccessful.22 While criminal indictments have been issued in the 
United States against the Internet Research Agency and several other 
 
17. Cf. Ashley C. Nicolas, Taming the Trolls: The Need for an International Legal 
Framework to Regulate State Use of Disinformation on Social Media, 107 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 
36, 50 (2018) (proposing the need for an international response to address disinformation 
campaigns). 
18. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Decentralized Cyberattack Attribution, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 
UNBOUND 213, 217 (2019). 
19. While this Article focuses on the ability of U.S. citizens (or permanent residents) to 
pursue claims against Russia, similar proceedings could be initiated by citizens of any country 
who are able to claim victim status. 
20. Michael N. Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in the 
Grey Zones of International Law, 19 CHI. J. INT’L L. 30 (2018); Michael N. Schmitt, Grey Zones 
in the International Law of Cyberspace, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1 (2017); Jens David Ohlin, 
Did Russian Cyber Interference in the 2016 Election Violate International Law?, 95 TEX. L. 
REV. 1579 (2017); William Banks, State Responsibility and Attribution of Cyber Intrusions after 
Tallinn 2.0, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1501 (2017). 
21. See Rebecca Crootof, International Cybertorts: Expanding State Accountability in 
Cyberspace, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 565, 637 (2018). But see Bjornstjern Baade, Fake News and 
International Law, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1357, 1365 (2018) (arguing that the 1936 International 
Convention on the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace can offer mechanisms for 
addressing the modern challenges of “fake news”). 
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1602. See, e.g., Democratic National Committee v. The Russian 
Federation, 2019 WL 3423536, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). See generally Doe v. Ethiopia, 851 F.3d 
7 (D.C. Cir. 2017). But see Benjamin Kurland, Sovereign Immunity in Cyberspace: Towards 
Defining a Cyber-Intrusion Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 10 J. NAT’L 
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 255, 263 (2019); Scott A. Gilmore, Suing the Surveillance States: The 
(Cyber) Tort Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 46 COL. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
227, 233 (2015). 
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Russian entities, these proceedings do not directly involve the Russian 
government and may not be effective in deterring Russia’s actions.23 
And, of course, the First Amendment would provide significant 
protection to speech-related activities in any civil or criminal 
proceedings in US courts.24 Claims against the Russian government in 
Russia would also be futile.25 Claims against US social media 
companies such as Facebook and Twitter would not address Russia’s 
responsibility or hold it accountable.26 Accordingly, international 
human rights bodies may offer the only viable mechanism for pursuing 
direct accountability against Russia. 
II. THE INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY AND PROJECT 
LAKHTA 
The Internet Research Agency began operations in 2013 from a 
small building in the Primorsky district of St. Petersburg, Russia.27 
 
23. See Chimène I. Keitner, Attribution by Indictment, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 207, 
208-09 (2019). 
24. See, e.g., Philip M. Napoli, What If More Speech is No Longer the Solution: First 
Amendment Theory Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMM. L.J. 55, 59 (2018); 
Erwin Chemerinsky, False Speech and the First Amendment, 71 OKL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2018); Louis 
W. Tompros et al., The Constitutionality of Criminalizing False Speech Made on Social 
Networking Sites in a Post-Alvarez, Social Media-Obsessed World, 31 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 65, 
85 (2017); Brittany Vojak, Fake News: The Commoditization of Internet Speech, 48 CAL. W. 
INT’L L.J. 123, 144 (2017); Garrett Epps, Does the First Amendment Protect Deliberate Lies?, 
THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/does-
the-first-amendment-protect-deliberate-lies/496004/ [https://perma.cc/54M2-V58M]. 
25. In Russia, the nature of these claims and corruption within the judiciary ensure that 
such claims would be unsuccessful. See generally OLGA ROMANOVA, CARNEGIE MOSCOW 
CTR., THE PROBLEM WITH THE RUSSIAN JUDICIARY (2018), 
https://carnegie.ru/commentary/75316 [https://perma.cc/XZ5W-HUFE]; MARIA POPOVA, 
POLITICIZED JUSTICE IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES: A STUDY OF COURTS IN RUSSIA AND 
UKRAINE (2012). 
26. Moreover, there are significant hurdles in bringing such claims against social media 
companies. See generally Force v. Facebook, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d 315 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); Cohen 
v. Facebook, 252 F. Supp. 3d 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2017). 
27. See generally April Glaser, What We Know About How Russia’s Internet Research 
Agency Meddled in the 2016 Election, SLATE (Feb. 16, 2018), 
https://slate.com/technology/2018/02/what-we-know-about-the-internet-research-agency-and-
how-it-meddled-in-the-2016-election.html [https://perma.cc/TA37-8274]; Polina Rusyaeva & 
Andrei Zakharov, Investigation of RBC: How the “Factory of Trolls” Worked in the Elections 
in the United States, RBC MAG. (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://www.rbc.ru/magazine/2017/11/59e0c17d9a79470e05a9e6c1 [https://perma.cc/4GS8-
4LPA]; Adrian Chen, The Agency, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 2, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html [https://perma.cc/4977-
6GFL]. 
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After an aggressive recruitment period, the Agency moved to a larger, 
four-story office building.28 By 2015, the Agency employed hundreds 
of workers, most of whom were responsible for generating online 
content.29 Workers were well-paid by Russian standards and were 
offered bonuses for excellent work as well as corresponding fines for 
underperformance.30 According to its former employees, workers were 
required to post new content daily.31 They worked twelve-hour shifts 
and were responsible for generating both new content as well as 
commenting on content drafted by other workers.32 When engaged in 
online activity, workers would use an Internet proxy service to hide 
their IP addresses.33 Content decisions were made by managers who 
reviewed web traffic and statistical reports to assess project impact. 
Workers would then receive detailed instructions on what issues to 
address.34 While online contents initially focused on Russian topics—
the war in Ukraine, Russian politics, and the economy—they soon 
began addressing US politics, including the 2016 presidential 
election.35 
The Internet Research Agency operated as part of Project Lakhta, 
a broad-ranging Russian propaganda campaign.36 Project Lakhta was 
 
28. SETH HETTENA, TRUMP/RUSSIA: A DEFINITIVE HISTORY 191 (2018); Garrett M. Graff, 
Inside the Mueller Indictment: A Russian Novel of Intrigue, WIRED (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/inside-the-mueller-indictment-a-russian-novel-of-intrigue/ 
[https://perma.cc/5E4A-S3T2]. 
29. Rusyaeva & Zakharov, supra note 27. Neil MacFarquhar, Inside the Russian Troll 
Factory: Zombies and a Breakneck Pace, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/18/world/europe/russia-troll-factory.html 
[https://perma.cc/DQ2U-RX63]. 
30. P.W. SINGER & EMERSON T. BROOKING, LIKE WAR: THE WEAPONIZATION OF SOCIAL 
MEDIA 111-149 (2017); Chen, supra note 27. 
31. MacFarquhar, supra note 29. 
32. SINGER & BROOKING, supra note 30, at 110-16. 
33. Chen, supra note 27. 
34. Id. 
35. See generally DIANA PILIPENKO & TALIA DESSEL, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 
FOLLOWING THE MONEY: TRUMP AND RUSSIA-LINKED TRANSACTIONS FROM THE CAMPAIGN 
TO THE PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION (2018), 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2018/12/22043523/FollowTheMoney-
report2.pdf [https://perma.cc/4F2T-DE76]; Julia Ioffe, What Russian Journalists Uncovered 
About Russian Election Meddling, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 30, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/12/russia-hackers-journalism-press-
freedom-troll-factory/549422/ [https://perma.cc/3L65-B8S2]. 
36. Lakhta is a historic area located in the Primorsky district of St. Petersburg. See 
generally Sadie Gurman & Byron Tau, U.S. Charges Russian with Trying to Influence 2018 
Midterms, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-says-china-russia-
iran-trying-to-intervene-with-elections-1539973093 [https://perma.cc/EH3F-6PWY]; Garrett 
2019] SUING RUSSIA 9 
designed to develop and spread misinformation campaigns on various 
issues, including misinformation on political candidates.37 It operated 
with a multi-million dollar budget funded by Yevgeniy Viktorovich 
Prigozhin, a wealthy Russian executive with close connections to 
Vladimir Putin and the Russian government.38 Specific funding for the 
Internet Research Agency was funneled through companies controlled 
by Prigozhin, including Concord Management and Consulting LLC.39 
The connections between the Russian government and the 
propaganda campaign were identified in the January 2017 report—
Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections—
prepared by the Director of National Intelligence.40 While the full 
report was highly classified, a shorter declassified report described 
Russian activities and intentions during the 2016 presidential elections. 
The declassified report revealed multiple actors within the Russian 
government were involved in ordering and managing the campaign. 
Significantly, the report indicated Russian President Vladimir Putin 
had ordered the propaganda campaign to target the US presidential 
election.41 In addition, the report determined that Russia’s intelligence 
services conducted cyber operations against targets associated with the 
2016 election and that Russia’s state-run propaganda machine 
contributed to the campaign.42 
Russian connections were also recognized by the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in its March 2018 
report—Report on Russia’s Active Measures.43 The report described 
 
M. Graff, Russian Trolls are Still Playing Both Sides—Even with the Mueller Probe, WIRED 
(Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/russia-indictment-twitter-facebook-play-both-
sides/ [https://perma.cc/83LM-YSAJ]. 
37. Criminal Complaint at 4, United States v. Khusyaynova, No. 1:18-MJ-464 (E.D. Va. 
Sept. 28, 2018). 
38. Nick Allen & Rozina Sabur, US Charges Russian Woman Elena Khusyavnova with 
Interfering in US Elections, THE TELEGRAPH (Oct. 19, 2018), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/10/19/us-charges-russian-womanelena-khusyaynova-
interfering-us-elections/ [https://perma.cc/P4T8-5EED]. 
39. Khusyaynova Criminal Complaint, supra note 37, at 4-5. 
40. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELL., ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND 
INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS (2017) [hereinafter 2017 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
REPORT]. 
41. Id. ii. 
42. Id. ii-iii. 
43. HOUSE PERM. SELECT COMM. ON INTELL., REPORT ON RUSSIA’S ACTIVE MEASURES 
(2018), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=809811 [https://perma.cc/PH35-R5HP] [hereinafter 
HPSCI REPORT]. 
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the campaign as multi-faceted and designed to affect the United 
States.44 
The Russian active measures campaign against the United States 
was multifaceted. It leveraged cyberattacks, covert platforms, 
social media, third-party intermediaries, and state-run media. 
Hacked material was disseminated through this myriad network of 
actors with the objective of undermining the effectiveness of the 
future administration. This dissemination worked in conjunction 
with derisive messages posted on social media to undermine 
confidence in the election and sow fear and division in American 
society.45 
The Committee confirmed that Russia’s social media posts were 
generated “to promote divisive social and political messages across the 
ideological spectrum.”46 The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
(“SSCI”) issued a similar report establishing an explicit connection 
between the Russian government and the propaganda campaign.47 
The details of Project Lakhta, as well as the connections between 
the Internet Research Agency and the Russian government, were 
described in two federal criminal filings. On February 16, 2018, the 
Justice Department filed a criminal indictment against the Internet 
Research Agency, Concord Management & Consulting, Concord 
Catering, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, and twelve other Russian nationals.48 
The indictment alleged the defendants were foreign agents engaged in 
a conspiracy to influence the US elections.49 The Internet Research 
Agency was described as a Russian organization “engaged in 
operations to interfere with elections and political processes.”50 
Concord Management & Consulting and Concord Catering were 
 
44. Id. at 11-37. 
45. Id. at 2. 
46. Id. at 33. 
47. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELL., THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT: 
ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT U.S. ELECTIONS (2018), 
https://www.burr.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SSCI%20ICA%20ASSESSMENT_FINALJULY
3.pdf [https://perma.cc/KK34-8BPS] [hereinafter SSCI REPORT]. The SSCI released a highly 
redacted follow-up report in July 2019. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELL., REPORT ON 
RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION 
(2019), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6214172/Senate-Intelligence-Committee-
report-on-Russian.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8T5-B3G40]. 
48. Indictment, United States v. Internet Research Agency L.L.C., No. 1:18-cr-00032-
DLF, (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018). 
49. Id. at 4. 
50. Id. at 2. 
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identified as Russian corporations connected to the Russian 
government. Collectively, these entities were part of Project Lakhta, 
which was described as a foreign interference operation targeting the 
United States and other countries.51 
On September 28, 2018, the Justice Department filed a criminal 
complaint against a Russian national, Elena Khusyaynova, for her 
alleged role as the Chief Accountant for Project Lakhta.52 The 
complaint described Project Lakhta as a plan to engage in “information 
warfare against the United States of America” by creating “fictitious 
social media personas, pages, and groups designed to attract US 
audiences and to address divisive US political and social issues.”53 
According to the complaint, Khusyaynova “managed the budgeting 
and payment of expenses associated with social media operations, web 
content, advertising campaigns, infrastructure, salaries, travel, office 
rent, furniture, and supplies, and the registration of legal entities used 
to further Project Lakhta activities.”54 
The Khusyaynova complaint provided numerous examples of 
how Project Lakhta’s social media campaign was designed “to sow 
division and discord in the U.S. political systems.”55 It described how 
some posts sought to promote social unrest over race and social justice 
issues. For example, the following image was posted on the Facebook 
account of “Rachell Edison,” an inauthentic social media account 
created through Project Lakhta.56 It was designed to gain support from 
 
51. Id. at 6-7. 
52. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Russian National Charged with Interfering in U.S. 
Political System (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/russian-national-charged-
interfering-us-political-system [https://perma.cc/5LB6-GN8N]. While the complaint was filed 
on Sept. 28, 2018, it remained sealed until Oct. 19, 2018. 
53. Criminal Complaint at 6, United States v. Khusyaynova, No. 1:18-MJ-464 (E.D. Va. 
Sept. 28, 2018). 
54. Id. at 5. 
55. Id. at 6. 
56. Id. at 23. 
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individuals who criticized the Black Lives Matter movement and 
similar groups opposed to police violence.57  
 
The post included the following comments: “Whatever happens, blacks 
are innocent. Whatever happens, it’s all guns and cops. Whatever 
happens, it’s all racists and homophobes. Mainstream Media.”58 
Other social media posts targeted religious minorities for 
discrimination. This Facebook post appeared on the Facebook account 
of “Bertha Malone,” another inauthentic account created through 
Project Lakhta.59 Its text indicates that it was designed to gain support 




59. Id. at 31. 
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The post included the following comment: “Damn right! And we all 
know which cult we need to kick out of America.”60 
In addition, social media posts targeted foreign nationals for 
discriminatory treatment. The following post also appeared on the 
“Bertha Malone” Facebook page.61 Its text indicates that it was 




61. Id. at 29. 
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This post included the following comment: “Stop separating families! 
Deport them all, including their anchor babies! And spend saved money 
on Americans who really need it, for example our homeless Vets.”62 
Because Project Lakhta operated through social media, there is an 
extensive record of its operations. Each of the affected social media 
companies—Facebook, Twitter, and Google—have released some of 
this information to the general public.63 They have also released 
additional information to the US government, including the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence. In 2018, the SSCI shared this data 
with two private research groups, the Computational Propaganda 
Research Project and New Knowledge, in order to generate an 
independent assessment of the Russian social media campaign.64 These 
groups released their reports in December 2018. According to SSCI 
Chair Richard Burr, “[t]his newly released data demonstrates how 
aggressively Russia sought to divide Americans by race, religion and 
ideology, and how the IRA actively worked to erode trust in our 
 
62. Id. 
63. See, e.g., How Are We Working to Protect Election Security on Facebook?, FACEBOOK 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.facebook.com/help/1991443604424859 
[https://perma.cc/DX2R-NMAD]; Elias Groll, Zuckerberg: We’re in an “Arms Race” with 
Russia and AI Will Save Us, FOR. POL’Y (Apr. 10, 2018), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/10/zuckerberg-facebook-were-in-an-arms-race-with-
russia-but-ai-artificial-intelligence-will-save-us/ [https://perma.cc/7SRH-DV52]. 
64. The Computational Propaganda Research Project is affiliated with Oxford University, 
and New Knowledge is a private cybersecurity company. 
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democratic institutions. Most troublingly, it shows that these activities 
have not stopped.”65 SSCI Vice Chair Mark Warner echoed this 
assessment, noting that “[t]hese reports demonstrate the extent to which 
the Russians exploited the fault lines of our society to divide Americans 
in an attempt to undermine and manipulate our democracy. These 
attacks against our country were much more comprehensive, 
calculating and widespread than previously revealed.”66 
The report prepared by the Computational Propaganda Research 
Project provided extensive details regarding the breadth of the social 
media campaign. Table 1 describes the volume of social media activity 
within Facebook and Instagram generated by the Internet Research 
Agency between 2015 and 2017.67 
 
Facebook ads and posts are listed separately because they reflect 
distinct methods for disseminating information to users. According to 
 
65. Press Release, Intelligence Committee, New Reports Shed Light on Internet Research 




67. PHILIP N. HOWARD ET AL., COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA RESEARCH PROJECT, THE 
IRA, SOCIAL MEDIA AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012-2018, at 5 
(2018). In Table 1, the first column from the left indicates the number of Facebook ads; the 
second column from the left indicates the number of Facebook posts; the third column from the 











Table 1: Volume of Facebook and Instagram Activity
(2015-2017) 
Facebook Ads Facebook Posts Instagram
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this data, social media activity increased significantly between 2015 
and 2017. In fact, it peaked after the 2016 presidential election. 
Table 2 describes the volume of social media activity on Twitter 
generated between 2015 and 2017.68 Twitter’s functionality allowed 
for more extensive messaging than Facebook or Instagram. 
 
The Computational Propaganda Research Project determined that 
Project Lakhta sought to generate conflict and division in American 
society. It did so in several ways. First, it encouraged African American 
voters to boycott the presidential elections or follow the wrong voting 
procedures.69 Second, it encouraged right-wing voters to be more 
extreme and confrontational.70 And third, it spread “sensationalist, 
conspiratorial, and other forms of junk political news and 
misinformation to voters across the political spectrum.”71 
Table 3 identifies the top thirteen issue areas for Facebook ads 
purchased by the Internet Research Agency.72  As evidenced in the 
data, the largest number of ad purchases involved the subject of race. 
 
68. Id. at 5. 
69. Id. at 3. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 







Table 2: Volume of Twitter Activity
(2015-2017)
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While Table 3 identifies the number of Facebook ads purchased, 
Table 4 indicates the impact of these ads. Specifically, it identifies the 
number of user impressions for these pages.73  The most popular ads, 
as reflected in user impressions, were also related to race. 
 
73. Id. at 23. A user impression represents the number of ad placements on a user’s 











Table 3: Number of Facebook Ads Purchased
(by subject matter)
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Finally, Table 5 presents the top twelve Facebook pages created 
by the Internet Research Agency.74 Many of these pages focused on 
race and minority groups, including Blacktivist, Black Matters (“BM”), 
Brown Power, and United Muslims of America.75 A significant 
number, including the top three Facebook pages, were openly critical 
of minority groups and several supported white nationalism.76 
 
 
74. Id. at 35. 











Table 4: Number of User Impressions for Facebook Ads
(by subject matter)
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The 2018 report prepared by New Knowledge confirmed that the 
Russian government, through the Internet Research Agency, 
orchestrated a massive and targeted social media campaign against the 
United States.77 The report highlights the following key points: 
• Social media operations targeted prominent political figures. 
• There were extensive anti-Hillary Clinton operations. 
• There was a clear bias for Donald Trump. 
• Operations promoted both secessionist and insurrectionist 
movements in the United States to sow discord at the local, 
state, and federal levels. 
• Operations promoted voter suppression. 
• Operations targeted the African American community.78 
 
Significantly, the report indicated that Russia’s efforts are ongoing.79 
In March 2019, Special Counsel Robert Mueller released his long-
awaited Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 
2016 Presidential Election. The report is unequivocal that “[t]he 
 
77. RENEE DIRESTA ET AL., NEW KNOWLEDGE, THE TACTICS AND TROPES OF THE 
INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY 3 (2018). 
78. Id. at 7-10. 









Table 5: Top Facebook Pages
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Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential election in 
sweeping and systematic fashion.”80 It refers to the Russian 
interference operations as “active measures” (активные 
мероприятия), which is “a term that typically refers to operations 
conducted by Russian security services aimed at influencing the course 
of international affairs.”81 While significant portions of the Mueller 
report were redacted, the released material highlights the connections 
between the Internet Research Agency and the Russian government.82 
The report described the structure of the Internet Research Agency and 
its funding and oversight.83 It provided detailed descriptions of the 
Internet Research Agency’s social media campaign, which included 
active measures using Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, and 
Tumblr.84 It also described the connections between Concord 
Management & Consulting and the Russian government.85 While the 
Mueller report clearly establishes the Russia connection, the US 
government has been forced to be more circumspect in describing this 
connection due to pending litigation involving Concord 
Management.86 
In sum, there is clear evidence of direct connections between the 
Russian government, Project Lakhta, and the Internet Research 
Agency. Significantly, these connections reveal that Project Lakhta 
was initiated and directed by Russian political leadership and its 
intelligence community. 
III. RUSSIA’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROJECT LAKHTA 
Under international law, state responsibility only exists for actions 
that can be attributed to state actors.87 There are several ways in which 
attribution can be established, and these principles are set forth in the 
Articles on State Responsibility prepared by the International Law 
 
80. MUELLER REPORT, supra note 12, at 1. 
81. Id. at 14. 
82. Id. at 1, 4, 9, 14. 
83. Id. at 15-19. 
84. Id. at 19-35. 
85. Id. at 14, 16-19. 
86. United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC, No. 18-cr-32-2 (DLF) slip op. at 
3 (D.D.C. July 1, 2019). 
87. See generally Helmut Philipp Aust, Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility 
(2011); James Crawford et al., The Law of International Responsibility (2010). 
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Commission.88 For example, attribution is established when a state 
organ “exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other 
function.”89 In other words, the actions of government entities can give 
rise to state responsibility under international law. In addition, the 
conduct of persons or entities that are exercising elements of 
governmental authority can be considered acts of the state even if these 
persons or entities are not state organs.90 Attribution also exists “if a 
person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instruction of, or 
under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the 
conduct.”91 And even when the conduct is not otherwise attributable to 
a state under these principles, such conduct may still be attributable 
when the state “acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its 
own.”92 
International law also recognizes that states must adhere to the 
principle of due diligence and the obligation to prevent transboundary 
harm.93 It is a basic precept of customary international law that can be 
traced to the seminal Trail Smelter arbitration decision, which noted 
that a state “owes at all times a duty to protect other states against 
injurious acts by individuals from within their jurisdiction.”94 It was 
reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel 
case, where the Court held that states must not knowingly allow their 
“territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”95 
This is a duty of prevention that informs the analysis of attribution for 
harm that emanates from a state’s territory. Thus, a state may be held 
responsible for acts occurring in its territory that it knew about, or 
should have known about, and “failed to take appropriate steps.”96 
 
88. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifth-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 
(2001) [hereinafter SR Articles]; see generally JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: 
THE GENERAL PART (2013). 
89. SR Articles, supra note 88, art. 4. 
90. Id. art. 5. 
91. Id. art. 8. 
92. Id. art. 11. 
93. See generally DUNCAN FRENCH & TIM STEPHENS, ILA STUDY GROUP ON DUE 
DILIGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (FIRST REPORT) (2014); Robert P. Barnidge, Jr., The Due 
Diligence Principle under International Law, 8 INT’L COMM. L. REV. 81 (2006); Riccardo 
Pisillo-Mazzeschi, The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International Responsibility 
of States, 35 GERM. Y.B. INT’L L. 9 (1992). 
94. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1963 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1941). 
95. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9). 
96. Diplomatic and Consular Staff (United States v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3, 31-32 
(May 24). 
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Accordingly, states may be held responsible for harms that emanate 
from their own territory even if they did not authorize such harms.97 
While attribution for acts in cyberspace poses some unique 
challenges, these principles are equally applicable in the virtual 
world.98 In fact, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare applies the principles of state 
responsibility and attribution to cyber operations.99 While the Tallinn 
Manual 2.0 is not a legally binding document, it offers a contemporary 
application of traditional state responsibility and attribution rules to 
cyber operations. It does so in several ways. Consistent with the 
Articles on State Responsibility, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 indicates that 
cyber operations conducted by state organs, or by non-state actors that 
functioned under state direction or control, are attributable to that 
state.100 Cyber operations conducted by a non-state actor are 
attributable to a state if such operations were engaged in “pursuant to 
its instructions or under its direction or control” as well as if the state 
“acknowledges and adopts the operations as its own.”101 
At a broader level, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 recognizes the due 
diligence principle.102 Accordingly, “[a] State must exercise due 
 
97. See generally Beatrice A. Walton, Duties Owed: Low-Intensity Cyber Attacks and 
Liability for Transboundary Torts in International Law, 126 YALE L.J. 1460 (2017); Russell 
Buchan, Cyberspace, Non-State Actors and the Obligation to Prevent Transboundary Harm, 21 
J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 431 (2016). 
98. See generally Berenice Boutin, Shared Responsibility for Cyber Operations, 113 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 197 (2019); Barrie Sander, Democracy Under the Influence: Paradigms of State 
Responsibility for Cyber Influence Operations on Elections, 18 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 1 (2019); 
OFF. DIR. NAT’L INTELL., A GUIDE TO CYBER ATTRIBUTION (2018); Crootof, supra, note 21, 
at 572; Brian J. Egan, International Law and Stability in Cyberspace, 35 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
169 (2017); Jon R. Lindsay, Tipping the Scales: The Attribution Problem and the Feasibility of 
Deterrence Against Cyberattack, 1 J. CYBERSECURITY 53 (2015); Oren Gross, Cyber 
Responsibility to Protect: Legal Obligations of States Directly Affected by Cyber-Incidents, 48 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 481 (2015). 
99. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
OPERATIONS 17 (2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]. See generally Dan Efrony & Yuval 
Shany, A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyberoperations and Subsequent State 
Practice, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 583 (2018); Eric Talbot Jensen, The Tallinn Manual 2.0: 
Highlights and Insights, 48 GEO. INT’L L.J. 735 (2017). 
100. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 99, at 87, 94 (Rule 15 – Attribution of cyber 
operations by State organs). 
101. Id. at 94 (Rule 17 – Attribution of cyber operations by non-State actors). 
102. Some commentators have argued the Tallinn Manual 2.0 did not go far enough in 
applying the principle of due diligence to cyber operations. See Luke Chircop, A Due Diligence 
Standard of Attribution in Cyberspace, 67 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 643 (2018). This is, in fact, a 
highly disputed area. See, e.g., Eric Jensen & Sean Watts, A Cyber Duty of Due Diligence: 
Gentle Civilizer or Crude Destabilizer, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1555 (2017); Peter Margulies, 
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diligence in not allowing its territory or cyber infrastructure under its 
governmental control, to be used for cyber operations that affect the 
rights of, and produce serious adverse consequences for, other 
States.”103 Significantly, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 also recognizes that 
“international human rights law is applicable to cyber-related 
activities.”104 In such cases, “a State must: (a) respect the international 
human rights of individuals; and (b) protect the human rights of 
individuals from abuse by third parties.”105 
There is overwhelming evidence that Russia conducted a 
sophisticated campaign to influence the US political system in 
connection with the 2016 presidential election and, more broadly, to 
undermine the democratic process in the United States.106 Russian 
involvement in the social media campaign was first identified by the 
Director of National Intelligence in the January 2017 report, Assessing 
Russian Activities and Intentions in the Recent US Elections.107 In its 
March 2018 Report on Russia’s Active Measures, the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence concurred with the earlier 
assessments of the intelligence community and found them “to be 
based on compelling facts and well-reasoned analysis.”108 These 
findings were echoed in the July 2018 report of the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, which also supported the intelligence 
community’s assessment and findings on Russian involvement.109 
The February 2018 federal indictment of the Internet Research 
Agency provides more details on the role of the Russian government.110 
It described how corporations with direct connections to the Russian 
government provided funding to the Internet Research Agency.111 It 
also described how these organizations sought to hide their Russian 
connections. In addition to the Internet Research Agency, several 
 
Sovereignty and Cyber Attacks: Technology’s Challenge to the Law of State Responsibility, 14 
MELB. J. INT’L L. 496 (2013). 
103. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 99, at 30 (Rule 6 – Due diligence (general 
principle)). 
104. Id. at 182 (Rule 34 – Applicability). 
105. Id. at 196 (Rule 36 – Obligations to Respect and Protect International Human Rights); 
see also Rona & Aarons, supra note 16, at 503. 
106. See supra Part II. 
107. 2017 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 40, at ii-iii. 
108. HPSCI REPORT, supra note 43, at 22. 
109. SSCI REPORT, supra note 47, at 1. 
110. Indictment at 2-4, United States v. Internet Research Agency L.L.C., No. 1:18-cr-
00032-DLF, (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018). 
111. Id. at 6. 
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individuals with close contacts to Vladimir Putin were also indicted for 
their role in the social media campaign.112 The October 2018 federal 
indictment of Elena Khusyaynova offered even more details on the 
Russian connection to Project Lakhta and the work of the Internet 
Research Agency.113 
Under international law, Project Lakhta and the actions of the 
Internet Research Agency are attributable to Russia. These operations 
were directly authorized by President Putin and the Russian 
government.114 Thus, they can be attributed to Russia because the 
Internet Research Agency was acting under Russia’s direction and 
control. As noted by the International Law Commission, “[t]he 
attribution to the State of conduct in fact authorized by it is widely 
accepted in international jurisprudence.”115 This principle is reiterated 
in the Tallinn Manual 2.0, which indicates that cyber operations 
conducted by a non-state actor are attributable to a state if such 
operations were conducted “pursuant to its instructions or under its 
direction or control” as well as if the state “acknowledges and adopts 
the operations as its own.”116 Because Project Lakhta was specifically 
authorized by the Russian government, it is irrelevant that the Internet 
Research Agency is a private corporation or that it may have operated 
outside the official structure of the Russian government.117 Russia can 
also be held responsible for failing to comply with the principle of due 
diligence and the prevention of transboundary harm.118 
The Russian government has denied any connections to Project 
Lakhta or the Internet Research Agency. Elena Khusyaynova has not 
 
112. Neil MacFarquhar, Oligarch Tied to Troll Factory Earned Nickname “Putin’s Cook,” 
N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.wral.com/meet-yevgeny-prigozhin-the-russian-
oligarch-indicted-for-interfering-in-the-u-s-elections/17347516/ [https://perma.cc/ECE7-
R7J9]. 
113. Criminal Complaint at 4-5, United States v. Khusyaynova, No. 1:18-MJ-464 (E.D. 
Va. Sept. 28, 2018). 
114. 2017 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 40, at ii; see also Calamur, supra 
note 4. 
115. INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, DRAFT ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF 
STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS, WITH COMMENTARIES 47 (2008). 
116. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 99, at 94 (Rule 17 – Attribution of Cyber 
Operations by Non-State Actors). 
117. Applying the principles of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 reinforces this conclusion because 
Russia failed to comply with the due diligence principle. It allowed the Internet Research 
Agency to function within its territory and to engage in cyber operations that affected “the rights 
of, and produce[d] serious adverse consequences” for the United States. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, 
supra note 99, at 30. 
118. See Crootof, supra note 21, at 571-73. 
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responded to the criminal charges brought against her, although this is 
not surprising since she is in Russia and unlikely to be extradited to the 
United States.119 In contrast, Concord Management and Consulting has 
vigorously defended itself and has challenged its federal indictment on 
multiple grounds.120 
IV. SUING RUSSIA 
Russia has ratified several international agreements that require it 
to respect human rights. These include the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) as well 
as its Optional Protocol, and the European Convention on the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”).121 
 
119. Quinta Jurecic, Where in the World is Elena Khusyaynova?, LAWFARE, Oct. 26, 2018, 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/where-world-elena-khusyaynova [https://perma.cc/U48H-
R6ND]. Soon after she was indicted, Khusyaynova appeared on a Russian media outlet to deny 
the allegations and profess her innocence. 
120. See, e.g., United States v. Concord Management & Consulting LLC, 2019 WL 
2247792 (D.D.C. 2019); United States v. Concord Management & Consulting LLC, 347 F. 
Supp. 3d 38 (D.D.C. 2018); United States v. Concord Management & Consulting LLC, 317 F. 
Supp. 3d 598 (D.D.C. 2018). A Russian media company has even filed a civil lawsuit against 
Facebook alleging several causes of action arising out of Facebook’s decision to delete its 
account and online presence. Federal Agency of News LLC v. Facebook Inc., Case No. 5:18-
cv-07041-SVK (N.D. Cal. 2018). The Federal Agency of News (“FAN”) is a Russian 
corporation located in St. Petersburg, Russia. Its lawsuit alleges violations of the First 
Amendment, federal and state civil rights laws, breach of contract, and breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 10-18. While FAN has been linked to Project 
Lakhta and the Internet Research Agency, the complaint firmly rejected any such connections. 
Kartikay Mehrotra, Facebook’s Fake News War Has Russian Site Crying Censorship, 
BLOOMBERG, (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-
20/facebook-is-sued-by-russian-news-agency-over-blocked-account [https://perma.cc/465N-
E4A6]. And yet, when Elena Khusyaynova was indicted, she appeared on the Federal Agency 
of News to deny the allegations. But soon after filing the lawsuit, FAN was placed on a sanctions 
list established by the State Department and the Treasury Department in response to Russian 
intervention in the 2016 presidential election. Kevin Poulsen, Russian Trolls’ Lawsuit Against 
Facebook Hits a Wall, DAILY BEAST, (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.thedailybeast.com/russian-
trolls-lawsuit-against-facebook-hits-a-wall?source=articles&via=rss [https://perma.cc/X8QH-
HF880]. 
121. International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD]; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR Optional Protocol]; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 005 [hereinafter ECHR]. Russia ratified CERD 
in 1969. See Parties to the International Covenant on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, (last visited Oct. 10, 2019), available at 
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A common feature of the CERD, ICCPR, and ECHR is the 
establishment of a corresponding institutional body.122 The CERD 
Committee and the ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee have broad 
powers, including the ability to assess state self-reporting on treaty 
compliance, to serve as review bodies to adjudicate claims of treaty 
noncompliance, and to conduct independent investigations to study the 
status of human rights in member states. The European Court of Human 
Rights functions exclusively as a review body that adjudicates claims 
of state noncompliance with the ECHR. 
While these three treaty bodies have their own procedures and 
submission requirements, they all share a common feature: they allow 
individuals to bring claims (also referred to as communications or 
complaints) against member states.123 These treaty bodies are 
empowered to review these submissions and issue decisions (also 
referred to as opinions or observations) that determine whether a state 
has violated its obligations under the respective treaty regime. Unlike 
most international tribunals, these human rights bodies are victim-
centered—they empower individuals to bring claims against states and 
seek accountability from these states.124 Russia has accepted the 
competence of the CERD Committee and the Human Rights 
 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
2&chapter=4&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/4UTF-R3PB]. Russia ratified the ICCPR in 1973. 
See Parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. TREATY 
COLLECTION, (last visited Oct. 10, 2019), 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&src=IND [https://perma.cc/WT7A-GCVP]. Russia ratified the ECHR in 1998. See Parties to 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. TREATY 
COLLECTION, (last visited Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-
treaties/-/conventions/treaty/005/signatures?p_auth=zWPjjBnD [https://perma.cc/LND3-
KNL5]. 
122. See, e.g., COURTNEY HILLEBRECHT, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNALS: THE PROBLEM OF COMPLIANCE 4-10 (2014); YUVAL SHANY, 
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 253 (2014); UN HUMAN RIGHTS 
TREATY BODIES: LAW AND LEGITIMACY 320 (Helen Keller & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2012); 
GUDMUNDUR ALFREDSSON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING 
MECHANISMS 35, 487, 617 (2d rev. ed. 2009). 
123. See generally SARAH JOSEPH & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT 
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, & COMMENTARY (3d ed. 2014); 
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 
(2014); PATRICK THORNBERRY, THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF 
ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (2016). 
124. See, e.g., WILLIAM SCHABAS, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (William 
Schabas ed. 2014); A.A. CANÇADO TRINDADE, THE ACCESS OF INDIVIDUALS TO 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (2012). 
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Committee to consider communications from individuals who claim to 
be victims of violations of the CERD and ICCPR, respectively. Russia 
has also accepted the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human 
Rights to consider claims by individuals who allege Russian violations 
of the ECHR.125 Despite this, several jurisdictional issues and 
admissibility requirements must be addressed before an individual may 
pursue claims against Russia in these treaty bodies.126 
A. Substantive Claims 
Russia is bound by the substantive obligations of the CERD, 
ICCPR, and ECHR. These treaties recognize that individuals have a 
basic set of human rights. These include the right to be free from 
discrimination and the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion. They also include the right to vote as well as the right to hold 
opinions without interference.127 In addition, these treaties 
acknowledge states have an obligation to protect these human rights. 
To be clear, these human rights norms apply to protect individuals, and 
they are distinct from international norms that protect states.128 
For example, the right to be free from discrimination based on 
race, color, and descent, as well as national and ethnic origin, is 
recognized in the CERD, ICCPR, and ECHR.129 Discrimination is 
defined by CERD to include: 
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, 
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose 
 
125. In contrast, Russia would not be subject to the jurisdiction of other human rights 
bodies such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights or the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights because it has not accepted the jurisdiction of these bodies. While 
the United States has ratified CERD and the ICCPR, it is not a party to the ECHR. But, in fact, 
US ratification has no impact on the possibility of US citizens commencing proceedings against 
Russia in these three treaty bodies. 
126. See generally EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, PRACTICAL GUIDE ON 
ADMISSIBILITY GUIDE (4th ed. 2017) [hereinafter ECHR PRACTICAL GUIDE]; U.N. OFFICE OF 
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINT PROCEDURES UNDER 
THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (2013) [hereinafter OHCHR INDIVIDUAL 
COMPLAINT PROCEDURES]. 
127. Other human rights norms are also implicated, including the right to privacy. See Lisl 
Brunner, Digital Communications and the Evolving Right to Privacy, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 217 (2018); Eliza Watt, The Right to Privacy and the 
Future of Mass Surveillance, 21 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 773 (2017). 
128. There is a distinction between the violation of human rights norms and sovereignty 
norms. See Ohlin, supra note 20, at 1587-95. 
129. For a detailed analysis, see William J. Aceves, Virtual Hatred: How Russia Tried to 
Start a Race War in the United States, 24 U. MICH. J. RACE & L. 177, 209-25 (2019). 
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or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other 
field of public life.130 
The ICCPR and the ECHR also prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, and national origin.131 
Project Lakhta targeted minorities on the basis of race, color, and 
national origin.132 Many Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter posts 
distinguished individuals based on these characteristics. These posts 
challenged the right of these individuals to the recognition, enjoyment, 
and exercise of basic human rights. Some posts rejected their right to 
basic government services.133 Other posts promoted hatred and 
incitement to hatred by disparaging individuals based on race, color, or 
national origin.134 Some posts even called for violence against these 
groups.135 
Project Lakhta targeted religious minorities for similar treatment, 
thereby implicating both the prohibition against discrimination as well 
as the freedom of religion. While CERD does not specifically reference 
religion as a protected category, the CERD Committee has interpreted 
its protections against discrimination to cover religious 
discrimination.136 Both the ICCPR and the European Convention 
specifically prohibit religious discrimination.137 They also affirm the 
right of everyone to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.138 
These protections apply to state action that coerces or punishes 
adherents of a particular religion. 
International law recognizes the right of individuals to vote and 
participate in the political process.139 Project Lakhta violated these 
 
130. CERD, supra note 121, at art. 1(1). 
131. ICCPR, supra note 121, at arts. 2(1), 26; ECHR, supra note 121, art. 14. 
132. Aceves, supra note 129, at 1. 
133. Complaint at 31, United States of America v. Elena Alekseevna Khusyaynova, No. 
1:18-MJ-464 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2018). 
134. Id. at 29. 
135. Curt Devine, “Kill Them All”—Russian-Linked Facebook Accounts Called for 
Violence, CNN MONEY (Oct. 31, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/10/31/media/russia-
facebook-violence/index.html [https://perma.cc/35VR-93MT]. 
136. THORNBERRY, supra note 123, at 303-05, 351-56. 
137. ICCPR, supra note 121, arts. 2(1), 26; ECHR, supra note 121, art. 14. 
138. ICCPR, supra note 121, art. 18; ECHR, supra note 121, art. 9. 
139. See generally Niels Petersen, Elections, Right to Participate in, International 
Protection, MAX PLANCK ENCY. PUB. INT’L L. (2012), 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e785 
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basic norms.140 The right to vote was clearly subverted when US voters 
were targeted by systematic disinformation campaigns about specific 
candidates and issues. In addition, voter suppression efforts targeted 
specific groups with misinformation about voting procedures and even 
encouraged these groups to abstain from voting.141 
The right to vote is explicitly recognized in the ICCPR as well as 
Protocol 1 of the ECHR, which Russia has also ratified.142 The ICCPR 
indicates that citizens shall have the right to vote in elections that 
guarantee “the free expression of the will of the electors” and that are 
not affected by discrimination.143 The Human Rights Committee has 
indicated that “[v]oters should be able to form opinions independently, 
free of violence or threat of violence, compulsion, inducement or 
manipulative interference of any kind.”144 Protocol 1 of the ECHR 
indicates that elections must “ensure the free expression of the opinion 
 
[https://perma.cc/PUT8-PB3R]; DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to 
Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46 (1994); Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political 
Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 539 (1992); but see Ludvig Beckman, 
The Right to Democracy and the Human Rights to Vote: The Instrumental Argument Rejected, 
13 J. HUM. RTS. 381 (2013). Cf. Jacob Rush, Hacking the Right to Vote, 105 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 
67 (2018). 
140. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
83-84 (2019). See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 99, at 45 (“Illegal coercive interference 
could include manipulation of elections or of public opinion on the eve of elections, as when 
online news services are altered in favor of a particular party, false news is spread, or the online 
services of one party are shut off.”). 
141. See Joe Davidson, Russia and Republicans Attempt to Suppress Black Vote, But 
Russians are Slicker, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/12/19/russia-republicans-attempt-suppress-
black-vote-russians-are-slicker/?utm_term=.5e8b03f48591 [https://perma.cc/6DFW-CDH8]; 
Zak Cheney-Rice, What Russia Learned About Black Voters From America, N.Y. MAG., (Dec. 
17, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/12/russia-voter-suppression.html 
[https://perma.cc/PKN9-632F]; Young Mie Kim, Brennan Ctr. J., Voter Suppression Has Gone 
Digital, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 20, 2019), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/voter-suppression-has-gone-digital 
[https://perma.cc/AF2H-NPZL]. 
142. Russia ratified the Optional Protocol (Protocol I) to the ECHR in 1998. See Council 
of Europe, Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 009, (last visited Oct. 10, 2019), 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&src=IND [https://perma.cc/6JBA-DGRJ]. 
143. ICCPR, supra note 121, art. 25; KOH, supra note 140, at 83 (“An external attempt to 
distort the information that voters possess when they go to the polls also violates the human 
rights of the electors under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”). 
144. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 25: Article 25 (Participation 
in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote), ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (July 12, 
1996). 
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of the people in the choice of the legislature.”145 The European Court 
of Human Rights has indicated that the ECHR sets forth the same rights 
regarding the right to vote as the ICCPR.146 CERD requires member 
states to protect the right of all individuals to vote without 
discrimination.147 
In sum, Project Lakhta violated numerous international human 
rights norms. These norms are set forth in the CERD, ICCPR, and 
ECHR, and they apply to Russia because it ratified these treaties. 
B. Extraterritoriality 
By their terms, most treaties appear to limit the scope of member 
state obligations to their own territory.148 While the Internet Research 
Agency was located in Russia, it operated in cyberspace and its victims 
were in the United States. Accordingly, Russia could argue that its 
human rights obligations do not extend to protect individuals outside 
its territory, including in cyberspace. There is, however, growing 
recognition that human rights obligations extend beyond a state’s 
territory.149 Such obligations also apply when a state’s actions affect 
individuals outside its territory. In fact, such a functionalist approach 
now appears to be the norm.150 
 
145. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 3 Mar. 20, 1952, E.T.S. No. 9. 
146. Hirst v. United Kingdom, App. No. 74025/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005). 
147. CERD, supra note 121, art. 5(c). 
148. See generally MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY (2011); Oona A. Hathaway et al., Human 
Rights Abroad: When Do Human Rights Treaty Obligations Apply Extraterritorially?, 43 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 389 (2011). 
149. See generally Monika Heupel, How Do States Perceive Extraterritorial Human Rights 
Obligations? Insights from the Universal Periodic Review, 40 HUM. RTS. Q. 521 (2018); Hugh 
King, The Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations of States, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 521 
(2009); Mark Gibney et al., Transnational State Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights, 
12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 267 (1999); Theodor Meron, Extraterritoriality of Human Rights 
Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 78, 82 (1995). 
150. But see Ohlin, supra note 20, at 1585. There is some debate as to whether the 
extraterritorial application of human rights norms applies to all such norms. See, e.g., Martin 
Scheinin, Letter to the Editor from Former Member of the Human Rights Committee, Martin 
Scheinin, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 10, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/8049/letter-editor-
martin-scheinin/; Jennifer Daskal, Extraterritorial Surveillance Under the ICCPR . . . The 
Treaty Allows It!, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 7, 2014), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/7966/extraterritorial-surveillance-iccpr-its-allowed/ 
[https://perma.cc/9HC6-53EG]; Ashley Deeks, Extraterritorial Right to Privacy: A Response to 
Luca Urech, LAWFARE (Nov. 15, 2013), https://www.lawfareblog.com/extraterritorial-right-
privacy-response-luca-urech [https://perma.cc/89ZH-JVD6]. 
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In Georgia v. The Russian Federation, the International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”) considered whether Russia’s obligations under CERD 
were limited to Russian territory or extended beyond its borders to 
include Russian actions in Georgia.151 In its Provisional Measures 
Order, the ICJ concluded that Russia’s CERD obligations applied 
extraterritorially. 
[T]here is no restriction of a general nature in CERD relating to its 
territorial application . . . neither Article 2 nor Article 5, alleged 
violations of which were invoked by Georgia, contain a specific 
territorial limitation . . . . [T]he Court consequently finds that these 
provisions of CERD generally appear to apply, like other 
provisions of instruments of that nature, to the actions of a State 
party when it acts beyond its territory.152 
Significantly, the ICJ’s language implies that other human rights 
treaties would also have extraterritorial reach.153 And, in fact, similar 
determinations have been issued by the Human Rights Committee and 
the European Court of Human Rights.154 The reasons for such an 
approach are evident—the object and purpose of human rights treaties 
“would be severely undermined if States could evade responsibility by 
relocating their abuse of individuals.”155 
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 offers conflicting views on the 
extraterritorial application of human rights norms.156 In the absence of 
physical control over affected individuals, the International Group of 
Experts that drafted the Tallinn Manual 2.0 could not agree on whether 
activities conducted through cyberspace give rise to state liability under 
 
151. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures Order, I.C.J. REP. 353 
(Oct. 15, 2008). 
152. Id. at 109. 
153. The ICJ has made similar findings in several cases. See e.g., Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. REP. 168 
(Dec. 19, 2005); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ REP. 136 (July 9, 2004). 
154. JOSEPH & CASTAN, supra note 123, at 96-100; SCHABAS, supra note 123, at 100-102; 
THORNBERRY, supra note 123, at 171-78. See also Daniel Mogster, Toward Universality: 
Activities Impacting the Enjoyment of the Right to Life and the Extraterritorial Application of 
the ICCPR, EJIL: TALK! (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/towards-universality-
activities-impacting-the-enjoyment-of-the-right-to-life-and-the-extraterritorial-application-of-
the-iccpr/ [https://perma.cc/G7A6-E8VW]. 
155. NOAM UBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS 
205 (2010). 
156. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 99, at 182-86 (Rule 34 – Applicability). 
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customary international law.157 There was agreement, however, that the 
extraterritorial application of human rights treaties was governed by the 
provisions of those treaties.158 The understanding of the institutional 
bodies responsible for interpreting and applying these human rights 
treaties is, therefore, dispositive because these bodies would be 
adjudicating any such claims. 
State responsibility for harms that occur outside their territory can 
also be established through the principle of due diligence and the 
obligation to prevent transboundary harm. This principle of customary 
international law focuses on where the harmful conduct arose rather 
than on where the damage occurred.159 Essentially, this obligation is 
domestic rather than extraterritorial: states have “a duty to protect other 
states against injurious acts by individuals from within their 
jurisdiction.”160 Thus, this obligation would extend to harms that occur 
anywhere, including cyberspace.161 Even the Tallinn Manual 2.0 
recognizes the due diligence principle.162 
C. Victim Status 
In order to bring a claim before any of these human rights bodies, 
an applicant must be considered a victim. This requirement exists for 
CERD, the ICCPR, and the European Court.163 At a minimum, this 
means the applicant must be personally affected by a state’s acts or 
omissions. Human rights bodies generally do not accept a claim 
perceived as an actio popularis.164 This simply means an applicant 
 
157. Id. at 185. 
158. Id. at 186. 
159. JOANNA KULESZA, DUE DILIGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2016). 
160. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1963 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1941). 
161. See generally Akiko Takano, Due Diligence Obligations and Transboundary 
Environmental Harm: Cybersecurity Applications, 7 LAWS 36 (2018); Michael N. Schmitt, In 
Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, 125 YALE L.J. F. 68 (2015). 
162. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 99, at 30 (Rule 6 – Due Diligence (General 
Principle)). 
163. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, ¶ r. 
96(b), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/3/Rev. 10 (Jan. 11, 2012) [hereinafter HRC Rules of Procedure]; 
Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Rules of Procedure of the Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ¶ r. 91(b), U.N. Doc. CERD/C/35/Rev.3 (1986) 
[hereinafter CERD Rules of Procedure]; ECHR, supra note 121, art. 34; see also JOSEPH & 
CASTAN, supra note 123, at 71-75; SCHABAS, supra note 123, at 736-45; THORNBERRY, supra 
note 123, at 56. 
164. JOSEPH & CASTAN, supra note 123, at 75; SCHABAS, supra note 123, at 738-39; 
THORNBERRY, supra note 123, at 60. See generally FARID AHMADOV, THE RIGHTS OF ACTIO 
POPULARIS BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (2018); William J. Aceves, 
2019] SUING RUSSIA 33 
must have been personally affected and cannot claim victim status 
through the suffering of other individuals. 
While an applicant must be personally affected, this does not 
require the applicant to be specifically targeted. Human rights bodies 
have recognized victim status in cases involving hate speech directed 
at particular groups and not at specific individuals.165 In Rabbae, A.B.S. 
& N.A. v. Netherlands, for example, the Human Rights Committee 
accepted the victim status of the applicants and rejected claims they 
were pursuing an actio popularis.166 This case involved a Dutch 
politician who made numerous online and print media statements 
demeaning the Muslim community and non-Western immigrants. 
In the present case, the Committee notes that the authors do not 
bring abstract claims as members of the general population of the 
State party. The authors are Muslims and Moroccan nationals, and 
allege that Mr. Wilders’ statements specifically target Muslims, 
Moroccans, non-Western immigrants and Islam. The authors are 
therefore members of the category of persons who were the 
specific focus of Mr. Wilders’ statements. They also allege that 
they feel personally and directly affected by Mr. Wilders’ hate 
speech and suffer the effects of it in their daily lives, including 
through attacks on the Internet, and that they have been adversely 
affected by the signal given to the public, through the acquittal, 
that Mr. Wilders’ conduct is not criminal.167 
Another consideration in assessing victim status is whether the 
applicant is a human being, a group of individuals, an organization, or 
a business entity. Of the three treaty institutions, the Human Rights 
Committee appears to have the most restrictive view on victim status 
and generally limits claims to human beings.168 The European Court 
has the most liberal view on victim status due to the broad mandate 
offered by the ECHR. It allows persons as well as non-governmental 
 
Actio Popularis? The Class Action in International Law, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 353 
(2003). 
165. See generally Whittney Barth, Taking “Great Care”: Defining Victims of Hate Speech 
Targeting Religious Minorities, 19 CHI. J. INT’L L. 68 (2018). 
166. Rabbae, A.B.S. & N.A. v. Netherlands, Views adopted by the Committee under article 
5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Comm. No. 2124/2011, at ¶¶ 5.2, 9.5-9.6, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/117/D/2124/2011 (2017). 
167. Id. ¶ 9.6; see also Toonen v. Australia, Views of the Human Rights Committee under 
article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Comm. No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994). 
168. ICCPR Optional Protocol, supra note 121, art. 1; HRC Rules of Procedure, supra note 
163, ¶ r. 96(b); see also JOSEPH & CASTAN, supra note 123, at 71-79. 
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organizations and groups of individuals to bring claims.169 The CERD 
Committee is authorized by the treaty to consider communications 
submitted from “individuals or groups of individuals.”170 In TBB-
Turkish Union in Berlin/Brandenburg v. Germany, therefore, the 
CERD Committee allowed an organization to bring a claim in a case 
involving discriminatory statements made against Muslims and other 
citizens of Turkish heritage.171 
The European Convention adds an additional consideration 
related to victim status—a case is inadmissible if the applicant “has not 
suffered a significant disadvantage . . . .”172 The purpose of this 
requirement is to ensure that only meaningful harms are subject to legal 
proceedings. In other words, a violation must “attain a minimum level 
of severity to warrant consideration by an international court.”173 
D. Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies 
Human rights treaties typically require applicants to exhaust 
domestic remedies before initiating proceedings.174 This means an 
applicant must first seek to address alleged harms domestically through 
judicial or administrative proceedings.175 There is, however, a 
significant caveat to this requirement. Applicants are not required to 
exhaust domestic remedies that are considered futile.176 For example, 
applicants need not exhaust domestic remedies when they would have 
“no prospect of success before the domestic courts.”177 Similarly, the 
 
169. ECHR, supra note 121, art. 34; see also SCHABAS, supra note 123, at 737-45. 
170. CERD, supra note 121, art. 14(1); see also THORNBERRY, supra note 123, at 56-57. 
171. TBB-Turkish Union in Berlin/Brandenburg v. Germany, Opinion adopted by the 
Committee at its eighty-second session, 11 February to 8 March 2013, Comm. No. 48/2010, at 
¶ 11.3, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/82/D/48/2010 (2013). 
172. ECHR, supra note 121, art. 35(3)(b). 
173. ECHR PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 126, at 66-67. 
174. HRC Rules of Procedure, supra note 163, ¶ r. 96(f); CERD Rules of Procedure, supra 
note 163, ¶ r. 91(f); ECHR, supra note 121, art. 35(1); see also JOSEPH & CASTAN, supra note 
123, at 121-49; SCHABAS, supra note 123, at 764-769; THORNBERRY, supra note 123, at 56. 
175. See generally Matthew H. Adler, The Exhaustion of the Local Remedies Rule after 
the International Court of Justice’s Decision in ELSI, 39 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 641 (1990); A.A. 
CANÇADO TRINDADE, THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ITS RATIONALE IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS (1983). 
176. JOSEPH & CASTAN, supra note 123, at 130; SCHABAS, supra note 123, at 765; 
THORNBERRY, supra note 123, at 59. 
177. Carson and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 42184/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 58 
(2010). 
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exhaustion requirement does not apply if domestic proceedings are of 
unreasonable duration.178 
E. Statute of Limitations 
Some human rights bodies place limits on when an applicant may 
bring a claim. This temporal requirement generally functions in tandem 
with the exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement. Both the CERD 
Committee and the European Court require that a claim be brought 
within six months from the date on which a final decision was taken 
regarding domestic remedies.179 When the exhaustion of domestic 
remedies is considered futile, the six month period will run from the 
date that the alleged acts occurred or the date the applicant became 
aware of the act.180 The Human Rights Committee offers a more 
generous time period in which individuals may bring claims.181 A claim 
may be considered an abuse of the right of submission if it is not 
brought within five years from the exhaustion of domestic remedies.182 
F. Consideration of Other International Procedures 
An applicant is generally not allowed to bring concurrent actions 
involving the same issue before multiple human rights bodies.183 While 
human rights treaties create unique substantive obligations and 
corresponding institutional bodies, there is a recognition that 
concurrent proceedings are inefficient and waste the limited resources 
available to victims of human rights abuses. The Human Rights 
Committee and the European Court each impose this admissibility 
requirement on applicants.184 The CERD Committee asks applicants to 
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indicate whether “the same matter is being examined under another 
procedure of international investigation or settlement.”185 However, 
this is not designated as an admissibility requirement.186 Of course, 
there is no preclusion for cases brought by different individuals in each 
of the human rights bodies. 
Of the three human rights bodies, the decisions of the European 
Court are unique because they are considered legally binding on 
member states and there is an obligation to comply. Article 46 of the 
ECHR provides that member states “undertake to abide by the final 
judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.”187 And, 
significantly, the Committee of Ministers is authorized to supervise the 
execution of these judgments.188 While the decisions of the CERD 
Committee and the Human Rights Committee are considered 
authoritative interpretations of the respective treaties and should be 
implemented in good faith, they are not considered legally binding.189 
V. CONCLUSION 
Through Project Lakhta, Russia targeted the United States; but its 
actual targets and the real victims were the American people. The 
CERD Committee, Human Rights Committee, and the European Court 
of Human Rights offer US citizens an opportunity to hold Russia 
accountable for Project Lakhta and the work of the Internet Research 
Agency. There are, of course, some challenges with respect to 
jurisdiction and admissibility. Notwithstanding, there are several 
reasons why these claims should be brought.190 
Most significantly, there are no other viable forums to hear claims 
against Russia. A federal district court acknowledged the ultimate goal 
of Project Lakhta and the Internet Research Agency was “to sow 
discord among U.S. voters through divisive social media posts and 
political rallies. That goal, by itself, was not illegal.”191 While two 
criminal proceedings were filed in relation to Project Lakhta, neither 
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case involves the Russian government as a defendant. No civil cases 
have been filed against Russia in US or Russian courts. 
The commencement of proceedings against Russia will generate 
publicity and force it to respond in a public forum.192 Multiple filings 
will heighten their impact even if some cases are eventually 
consolidated. By highlighting these issues to the CERD Committee and 
the Human Rights Committee, these bodies may choose to address 
them in their future assessments of Russia’s compliance with their 
respective treaty obligations even if the cases do not move forward. 
These bodies may also address these issues in their General Comments 
regarding treaty norms. While the European Court does not have 
comparable authority to act outside the litigation process, the Council 
of Europe may choose to respond to Russia’s actions. 
Heightened publicity may result in these issues being addressed 
by other UN human rights mechanisms. Several UN thematic 
procedures could address these issues, including the UN Working 
Group of Experts on People of African Descent, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Minority Issues, and the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia 
and Related Intolerance.193 The use of social media by states to violate 
human rights could be addressed by the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression.194 
Finally, these issues could be addressed through the Universal Periodic 
Review process at the United Nations, which is designed to review 
Russia’s overall compliance with its human rights obligations.195 
Proceedings before human rights bodies offer a unique 
opportunity. This is a victim-centered process, which seems 
particularly important because human beings were Project Lakhta’s 
targets. Accordingly, victims should be able to file their own claims 
against Russia without the need for US government authorization or 
 
192. But see Jack Goldsmith, The Strange WannaCry Attribution, LAWFARE (Dec. 21, 
2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/strange-wannacry-attribution [https://perma.cc/T2RC-
9HAP]. 
193. See generally THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL PROCEDURES SYSTEM (Aoife Nolan et 
al. eds., 2017); TED PICCONE, CATALYSTS FOR CHANGE: HOW THE U.N.’S INDEPENDENT 
EXPERTS PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS (2012). 
194. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶¶ 2 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/35 
(Apr. 6, 2018). 
195. See HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW: RITUALS AND 
RITUALISM 1-22 (Hilary Charlesworth & Emma Larking eds., 2015). 
38 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:1 
support. This victim-centered approach is appropriate for other reasons. 
Social media users must take responsibility for monitoring and 
protecting their rights in cyberspace.196 Citizens also have an obligation 
to defend the democratic process, which is under attack.197 By relying 
solely on governments and social media companies to address these 
issues, citizens and social media users abdicate their own 
responsibilities. In fact, it is striking that many studies on the Russian 
disinformation campaign simply disregard the role of individuals in 
protecting their own rights.198 
Finally, Russia’s use of inauthentic social media accounts is 
ongoing.199 Efforts were made to influence the 2018 US midterm 
elections. Reports indicate similar efforts will be made to affect the 
2020 US presidential elections.200 In addition, Project Lakhta targeted 
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several countries.201 And, Russia is not alone in developing such online 
propaganda campaigns.202 
This Article is not meant to be purely descriptive or solely 
academic in nature. It has a prescriptive agenda that supports the 
initiation of legal proceedings against Russia.203 Individuals interested 
in bringing claims against Russia should examine the complaint 
requirements for each treaty body, review the model complaint forms, 
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